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ATTORNEY GENERAL:  
ROLE AND POWERS1
24.1 ATTORNEY GENERAL
The Attorney General is the principal legal adviser to the Government 
of Malaysia on matters of law and legal opinion. He is appointed by the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong (YDPA) on the advice of the Prime Minister 
from among a person who is qualified to be a judge of the Federal 
Court.2 Article 123 of the Federal Constitution provides that a person 
is qualified to be appointed as a Federal Court judge if for the ten years 
preceding his appointment, he has been an advocate, a member of the 
judicial and legal service of the Federation or of the legal service of a 
state, or sometimes one and sometimes another. The Attorney General 
shall hold office during the pleasure of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and 
shall not be removed from office except on the like grounds and in the 
like manner as a judge of the Federal Court.3
His role and resposibilities is to advise the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
(YDPA) or the cabinet or any minister upon such legal matters, and 
to perform such other duties of a legal character, as may from time 
to time be referred or assigned to him by the YDPA or the Cabinet, 
and to discharge the functions conferred on him by the Constitution 
or any other written law.4 Article 145 of the Federal Constitution gives 
IntroductionCHAPTER 24
1 This Chapter is contributed by Ashgar Ali Ali Mohamed and Muzaffar Syah 
Mellow.
2 See art. 145(1) of  the Federal Constitution.
3 See the Federal Constitution, art. 145(5), (6). For the removal of  a judge of  the 
Federal Court, see art. 125.
4 Article 145(2) of  the Federal Constitution.
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ample power to the Attorney General to represent the government 
and any body or person performing any functions under the 
Constitution.5
In Datuk Haji Harun Haji Idris v. Public Prosecutor,6 Suffian LP cited 
with approval the following observation by Lord Denning MR in 
AG ex rel McWhirter v. IBA,7 that “It is well settled that in our constitution 
in matters which concern the public at large the Attorney General is 
the guardian of the public interest. Although he is a member of the 
government of the day, it is his duty to represent the public interest with 
complete objectivity and detachment. He must act independently of any 
external pressure from whatever quarter it may come. As guardian of 
the public interest, the Attorney General has a special duty in regard to 
the enforcement of the law.”8 The Attorney General is also the guardian 
of public rights and is therefore competent to bring a ‘relator action’9 to 
restrain interference with a public right or to abate a public nuisance or 
to compel the performance of a public duty.10
5 Tun Dato’ Haji Mohamed Salleh Abas v. Tan Sri Dato’ Abdul Hamid Omar & Ors [1988] 
2 CLJ 739, SC.
6 [1976] 1 LNS 19, [1977] 2 MLJ 155 at 168, FC.
7 [1963] QB 629. See also Government of  Malaysia v. Lim Kit Siang [1988] 1 CLJ 219, SC.
8	 For	the	definition	of 	‘public	interest’	see	A Ragunathan v. PP [1982] CLJ 25, [1982] 
CLJ Rep 63 at p. 68, [1982] 1 MLJ 139 at p. 141-142; Kanawagi a/l Seperumaniam v. 
Dato’ Abdul Hamid bin Mohamad [2004] 5 MLJ 495.
9	 A	‘relator	action’	is	a	situation	where	the	public	wishing	to	enforce	a	right	which	
belongs to the public, apply to join the Attorney General in the proceedings for 
the purpose of  enforcing that public right. If  the Attorney General agrees to do 
so,	the	action	is	said	to	be	brought	by	the	Attorney	General	‘at	the	relation	of 	’	the	
member	of 	the	public	concerned	and	the	action	is	known	as	a	‘relator	action’.	See	
‘Relator	Actions’	at	http://	www.attorneygeneral.ie/ag/agrelator.html
10 See Attorney-General at and by the Relation of  Pesurohjaya Ibu Kota (Commissioner 
of  the Federal Capital), Kuala Lumpur v. Wan Kam Fong & Ors [1967] 1 LNS 7. 
See	also	‘The	Independence	of 	the	Attorney	General	and	the	Public	Interest’	by	
YBhg Tan Sri Abdul Gani Patail, Attorney General Of  Malaysia delivered at the 
International Malaysia Law Conference 2012 on 28 September 2012. The full paper 
is	 athttp://www.agc.gov.my/pdf/	 speech/international%20	 malaysia%20law%20
conference%202012_independence%20of%20attorney%20general%20&%20
public%20interest_20092012.pdf
 
FOR ACADEMIC 
REPOSITORY 
PURPOSES 
ONLY
733
The Attorney General is the alter ego of the Public Prosecutor and 
vice versa. Section 376(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) 
defines ‘Attorney General’ to mean the Public Prosecutor. Further, s. 3 
of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 (Act 388) (Consolidated and 
Revised 1989) defines ‘Public Prosecutor’ as the ‘Attorney General, and 
includes (within the scope of his authority) a Deputy Public Prosecutor 
appointed under any written law relating to criminal procedure and a 
person authorised by any such law to act as or exercise all or any of the 
powers of the Public Prosecutor or a Deputy Public Prosecutor.’ In the 
performance of his duties, the Attorney General shall have the right of 
audience in any court or tribunal in Malaysia.
24.2 SOLICITOR GENERAL
The Solicitor General is the second-ranked officer after the Attorney 
General. The Solicitor General is empowered to perform any of the 
functions that can be performed by the Attorney General when the 
latter is not able to perform his/her duties. This is provided under 
s. 40A of the Eleventh Schedule to the Federal Constitution. The section 
provides:
(1) Unless in any written law it is otherwise expressly provided, 
the Solicitor General may perform any of the duties and may 
exercise any of the powers of the Attorney General.
(2) Where the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or any other person has 
lawfully delegated his powers to the Attorney General such 
delegation shall, unless otherwise expressly provided, be 
deemed to be delegation of powers to both the Attorney 
General and the Solicitor General.
Further, s. 376(2) of the CPC provides: ‘The Solicitor-General shall 
have all powers of a Deputy Public Prosecutor and shall act as Public 
Prosecutor in case of the absence or inability to act of the Attorney 
General.’ In Leong Kok Huat v. Public Prosecutor,11 it was stated 
11 [1998] 4 CLJ 106.
Solicitor General
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inter alia, that the fact that the Attorney General may not be in his 
office because he has to perform his official duty elsewhere in Malaysia 
does not mean that ‘he was being away from work’ or connote ‘absence’ 
in the context of the legislative intention of s. 376(2) of the CPC. In 
the aforesaid circumstances, the Solicitor General cannot exercise 
any of the Attorney General’s powers as entrenched in art. 145 of the 
Federal Constitution. In Leong Kok Huat’s case, the court referred to 
the Canadian case of Cooper v. Croll,12 where it was stated that the word 
‘absence’ should be construed in its widest sense and as in this case, 
the mayor was ‘in the city’ at the time of a meeting of the municipal 
council; thus, his absence was not established.
24.3 DEPUTY PUBLIC PROSECUTORS
The Deputy Public Prosecutors may also exercise all or any of the 
rights and powers vested in or exercisable by the Public Prosecutor 
except those rights and powers which are to be exercised by the Public 
Prosecutor personally. Section 376(3) of the CPC provides that ‘The 
Public Prosecutor may appoint fit and proper persons to be Deputy 
Public Prosecutors who shall be under the general control and 
direction of the Public Prosecutor and may exercise all or any of the 
rights and powers vested in or exercisable by the Public Prosecutor 
by or under this Code or any other written law except any rights or 
powers expressed to be exercisable by the Public Prosecutor personally 
and he may designate any of such Deputy Public Prosecutors as Senior 
Deputy Public Prosecutors.’ Further s. 376(3A) provides that ‘the Public 
Prosecutor may appoint fit and proper persons to be Assistant Public 
Prosecutors who shall be under the general control and direction of 
the Public Prosecutor and, subject to such limitations or restrictions as 
may be specified by the Public Prosecutor, shall have all the powers of a 
Deputy Public Prosecutor.’
12 [1940] 1 DLR 610.
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In PP v. Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim,13 Tan Sri Mohammad Shafee bin 
Abdullah, an advocate and solicitor, was appointment under s. 376(3) 
of the CPC as Deputy Public Prosecutor to lead the prosecution team in 
their appeal at the Court of Appeal against the acquittal of the respondent 
over his sodomy charge. In an attempt to disqualify Tan Sri Shafee from 
appearing in the appeal or acting as counsel on behalf of the Public 
Prosecutor, the respondent alleged inter alia, that the appointment of 
Tan Sri Shafee was a nullity. In dismissing the application and holding 
that the appointment was valid and lawful, the Court of Appeal held:
By virtue of s. 376(3), the PP may appoint fit and proper persons to be 
DPPs, and a DPP so appointed may exercise all or any of the rights and 
powers vested under the law unless the law expressly states that such 
power had to be exercised by him personally. Under s. 379, by fiat of 
the PP, an advocate may be employed by the Government to conduct 
criminal prosecution or inquiry or to appear in any criminal appeal on 
point of law reserved to the PP.14
Again in Muhammad Shafee Md Abdullah v. PP,15 application was 
made for an order that Datuk Seri Gopal Sri Ram be disqualified 
from continuing to act as a Senior Deputy Public Prosecutor and/
or to appear on behalf of the Public Prosecutor in Public Prosecutor 
v. Muhammad Shafee Bin Md Abdullah Case No. WA-62R-43-09/2018, 
a criminal case involving offences of money laundering. The Public 
Prosecutor is represented by Gopal Sri Ram, an advocate and solicitor 
and a former Federal Court Judge who has been appointed a Senior 
Deputy Public Prosecutor under s. 376(3) of the Criminal Procedure 
Code. It was held, inter alia, that ‘s. 376(3) of the Criminal Procedure 
Code does not contain anything which limits the powers of the Public 
Prosecutor to only appoint legal officers under the Judicial and Legal 
Service Community as Deputy Public Prosecutor or designate them as 
Senior Deputy Public Prosecutor. It also empowers Public Prosecutor 
to appoint non-legal officers as Deputy Public Prosecutor.’
13 [2014] 1 CLJ 354, CA.
14 See also Repco Holdings v. Public Prosecutor [1997] 4 CLJ 740.
15 [2019] 1 LNS 844.
Deputy Public Prosecutors
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24.4 FEDERAL COUNSEL IN CIVIL MATTERS
In civil matters, s. 24(3) of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 
(Revised 1988) (Act 359) provides for the appearance of law officers as 
follows: ‘An advocate and solicitor of the High Court duly retained by 
the Attorney General in the case of civil proceedings by or against the 
Federal Government or a Federal officer, or by the Legal Adviser, or, 
in the case of the States of Sabah and Sarawak, by the State Attorney 
General in the case of civil proceedings by or against the Government 
of a State or a State officer, may appear as advocate on behalf of such 
Government or officer in such proceedings.’ For example, in the Civil 
Division of Attorney General Chamber, the Senior Federal Counsel 
and Federal Counsel from this Division are engaged to perform the 
roles and functions of the Attorney General, namely, represent the 
Government in all civil proceedings, in matters of public interest, 
represent the Attorney General in petitions for admissions as advocates 
and solicitors pursuant to the Legal Profession Act 1976, process 
applications for Special Admission Certificates and Certificates of 
Renewal under Part IIA of the Legal Profession Act 1976 as well as 
represent the Attorney General in cases concerning public, religious, 
social or charitable trust.16
24.5 WHETHER ATTORNEY GENERAL SUPERVISES 
AND CONTROLS JUDICIAL OFFICERS?
It is noteworthy that in Maleb Su v. Public Prosecutor,17 it was stated 
inter alia, that in order to set aside the decision made by the Magistrate 
on the alleged grounds of biasness there must be a real likelihood of 
biasness on the part of the Magistrate and that reasonable suspicion of 
biasness is insufficient. As in the above case, the fact that as the Attorney 
General has supervision and control of the judicial officers is insufficient 
to support the allegation that there is a likelihood of biasness. In this 
case, an application was made to disqualify the Magistrate from hearing 
16	 Official	Portal	of 	Attorney	General’s	Chambers	of 	Malaysia,	http://www.agc.gov.
my, as viewed on 1 June 2014.
17 [1984] 1 CLJ 378.
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the case on the ground that the Magistrate belonged to a service in 
which the Attorney General is the head of the service. It was alleged 
that since the Attorney General was also the Public Prosecutor and has 
supervision and control over the judicial officers, there was a likelihood 
of bias. In other words, the applicant feared that the Magistrate would 
be biased because he is a member of the Judicial and Legal Service, of 
which the Attorney General is the head. In dismissing the application, 
Hashim Yeop A Sani FJ stated:
The judicial and legal service is one of the public services mentioned in 
Art 132 cl (1) of the Federal Constitution. The authority which exercises 
jurisdiction over the officers of the service in matters of promotions 
and discipline is the Judicial and Legal Service Commission established 
under Art 138 of the Constitution of which the Attorney General is 
only a member. There is nothing in law to say that the Attorney General 
is head of the service; in fact he cannot be by virtue of Art 138 of the 
Constitution. An officer belongs to the judicial and legal service but 
he may serve in various different capacities in the Judicial Department 
and Legal Department. As normal in the administrative set-up of the 
public service each department has its own head. And the Attorney 
General is not the head of the Judicial Department. Thus, looking at the 
legal and administrative framework governing the service ... the facts 
here warrant a conclusion of real likelihood of bias.
In Cheak Yoke Thong v. Public Prosecutor,18 a question of law was 
referred to the defunct Federal Court as follows: ‘Whether the fear on 
the applicant’s part that the learned Magistrate being a member of the 
Judicial and Legal Service of which the Attorney-General is the highest 
ranking officer, having control of the learned Magistrate’s career in the 
said service was reasonable to hold that there could be bias or there 
was reasonable suspicion of bias whereby it was reasonable to say that 
in these circumstances justice may not seem to be done.’ In answering 
the question posed in the negative, the court noted that the fear of the 
applicant as above cannot be a sufficient reason for the Magistrate to 
disqualify himself from hearing the case. The applicant must show by 
evidence that the adjudicating officer or the tribunal was in fact biased 
18 [1984] 2 CLJ 83, FC.
Whether Attorney General 
Supervises And Controls Judicial Officers?
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or is likely to be so. It was further stated that it was factually or legally 
incorrect to say that the Attorney General has control of the learned 
Magistrate’s service.
The court also noted that the Magistrates are appointed by the Ruler of 
the State, or in the case of Federal Territory by Yang di-Pertuan Agong, 
on the advice of the Chief Justice.19 Further, the transfer of Magistrates 
from one judicial post to another judicial post is completely under the 
authority of the Chief Justice, while a transfer from a judicial post to a 
legal post is a matter of consultation and agreement between the Chief 
Justice and the Attorney General. Besides the above, their promotion in 
the Service is the function of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission 
and is subject to the confidential report of the Judge of the State where 
the Magistrate is currently or previously posted and also subject to 
the recommendations by the Chief Justice. It would be worthwhile 
reproducing the observation by Salleh Abas LP as follows:
The Attorney-General today is a civil servant. He belongs to the Judicial 
and Legal Service and being the highest paid officer in the Service it is 
natural that he assumes the leadership in the Service and is thus referred 
to as head of the Service for better or for worse. But this fact alone does 
not create an ‘inherent or legal bias’ ... to disqualify [magistrate] from 
hearing ... case. Whether one likes it or not the present position of the 
Attorney-General in the system of criminal justice is perfectly in accord 
with the law and the Constitution. Being a member of the Judicial and 
Legal Service, the Attorney-General is a civil servant, and holds office 
- just as other officers and Magistrates do - during pleasure of the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong, meaning his appointment is terminable by the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong and his service is terminable by the Commission 
subject to the safeguards provided for in the Constitution. These facts 
are all the legal and constitutional realities and we cannot see how a 
situation which is firmly established by law and the Constitution can be 
said to be a legal bias.
19 See ss. 78 and 79 of  the Subordinate Courts Act 1948 (Revised 1972) (Act 92). It 
must be noted that currently the Malaysian Judiciary is headed by the Chief  Justice 
of  the Federal Court (formerly called the Lord President). The President heads the 
Court of  Appeal whilst two Chief  Judges head the High Court in Malaya and the 
High Court in Sabah and Sarawak.
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24.6 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT
The Attorney General’s Chambers (AGC) are divided into several 
divisions as follows:
Advisory Division: To provide legal advice to the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong, the Cabinet and any Minister on any legal matters. To attend 
Parliament when in session to provide any assistance of a legal 
nature as may be required.
Civil Division: The Division’s primary objective is to ensure that 
all civil claims brought by and against the Government of Malaysia 
are conducted diligently and efficiently in accordance with law and 
justice. A Senior Federal Counsel / Federal Counsel is authorised 
to appear in any civil proceedings by or against the Government 
as advocated and authorised to make such appearances, take such 
actions and make such applications in respect of such proceedings 
on behalf of the Government.
Drafting Division: To ensure that the Bills drafted for tabling in 
Parliament are consistent with the Federal Constitution and are 
in accordance with legislative drafting norms. To ensure that the 
subsidiary legislation drafted is not ultra vires with any of the Acts/ 
Ordinances and to ensure that it is in accordance with legislative 
drafting norms.
Prosecution Division: To give advice and instructions to all related 
law enforcement agencies and to conduct prosecutions in accordance 
with criminal procedures with an objective to protect public interest 
by ensuring that criminals are punished in accordance with the law. 
To conduct prosecutions in the ordinary courts of law (civil courts).
International Affairs Division: To protect and improve Malaysia’s 
rights and interests in the international arena. To give legal advice 
and views to the Malaysian government in accordance with the 
international law and principles taking into account the policy of the 
Malaysian government, public interest and domestic laws. To ensure 
that Malaysia’s international obligation under any agreements, 
treaties and conventions which have been signed, agreed upon, 
ratified or participated by Malaysian government are carried out in 
accordance with the Malaysian laws and policies.
Attorney General’s Department
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Law Review And Law Reform Division: To reprint and update all 
laws of Malaysia and its subsidiary legislations. Another important 
function performed by this Division is preparing the order for 
extension and modification of laws applicable in West Malaysia 
to Sabah and Sarawak. To make research to identify archaic law, 
anomalies in various laws, obsolete and unnecessary statutes that 
need to be repealed, duplicate statutes that need to be consolidated 
and amalgamated, and generally to simplify and modernise the laws.
Management Division: The primary objective of the Management 
Division is to provide support services in terms of human resource, 
administration, finance and a conducive working environment 
so as to ensure that the Chambers’ objectives and policies are 
implemented smoothly and efficiently. The functions carried 
out by the Management Division are numerous and inclusive of 
activities pertaining to Human Resource Management, Financial 
Management, General Administration and ICT Management.20
24.7 POWERS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN 
CRIMINAL CASES
Pursuant to the CPC, when an offence has been committed, the victim 
may lodge a police report in accordance with the Code. Section 107 
of the CPC provides that a police officer is duty bound to receive any 
information in relation to any offence committed anywhere in Malaysia. 
The information, which is also known as the ‘first information report’, is 
also the basis upon which the police will commence their investigation.21 
20	 Official	Portal	of 	Attorney	General’s	Chambers	of 	Malaysia,	http://www.agc.gov.
my, as viewed on 1 June 2014.
21 In Public Prosecutor v. Mohamad Musa Amarullah [2002] 1 CLJ 366, Kamalanathan J 
held	that	the	first	 information	report,	which	 is	the	first	recorded	information	to	
the police with regard to a particular offence, forms the basis to commence a full 
throttled	investigation.	An	accused	must,	as	of 	right,	be	given	a	copy	of 	this	first	
information report.
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The police would conduct the investigation in accordance with the 
procedures laid down in the CPC. Upon completing the investigation, 
the report will then be submitted to the Attorney General’s chambers. 
The investigation report will set forth the names of the parties, nature 
of the information, and the names of the persons who appear to be 
acquainted with the circumstances of the case. The Attorney General 
will then determine whether to institute and conduct criminal 
proceedings and prosecutions.
Section 376(1) of the CPC provides that the Public Prosecutor has the 
control and direction of all criminal prosecutions and proceedings 
under the Code. Further, the powers of the Attorney General is 
explained in art. 145(3) of the Federal Constitution as follows: ‘The 
Attorney General shall have power, exercisable at his discretion, to 
institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for an offence, other 
than proceedings before a Syariah Court, a native court or a court- 
martial.’ In Gu Kien Lee v. Ketua Polis Daerah Kota Kinabalu & Anor,22 
it was stated inter alia, that ‘the power of the police is to investigate, not 
to decide whether any person is or is not to be prosecuted for any crime 
or, for that matter, to decide whether a police report discloses a civil or a 
criminal matter. That power lies with the Attorney General acting in his 
capacity as public prosecutor as provided in art. 145(3) of the Federal 
Constitution read together with s. 376(1) of the CPC.’
The word ‘institute’ in art. 145(3) refers to a commencement of criminal 
proceedings and prosecutions.23 A prosecution is instituted when 
an accused is called upon to plead to a charge.24 A power to institute 
criminal proceedings includes a power to prefer a less serious charge 
when the evidence discloses a graver offence. Such power also allows 
22 [2012] 2 CLJ 317.
23 See Public Prosecutor v. Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris & Ors [1976] 1 LNS 180; Public 
Prosecutor v. Lim Shui Wang & Ors [1979] 1 MLJ 65 at 67, SC.
24 See Perumal v. Public Prosecutor [1970] 1 LNS 101, FC.
Powers Of  The Attorney 
General In Criminal Cases
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the Attorney General not to prefer charges at all. The discretion vested 
in the Attorney General under the Federal Constitution art. 145(3) is 
unfettered and cannot be challenged and substituted by the courts.25
In Long bin Samat & Ors v. Public Prosecutor,26 the Federal Court, in 
interpreting cl. (3) of art. 145 stated:
In our view, this clause from the supreme law clearly gives the 
Attorney General very wide discretion over the control and direction 
of all criminal prosecutions. Not only may he institute and conduct 
any proceedings for an offence, he may also discontinue criminal 
proceedings that he has instituted, and the courts cannot compel him to 
institute any criminal proceedings which he does not wish to institute 
or to go on with any criminal proceedings which he has decided to 
discontinue ... Still less then would the court have power to compel him 
to enhance a charge when he is content to go on with a charge of a less 
serious nature.27
25 See Karpal Singh & Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1991] 2 CLJ 1458, [1991] 1 CLJ Rep 183 
at p. 191, SC; Datuk Yong Teck Lee & Ors v. Public Prosecutor [1996] 2 CLJ 413 at p. 
426, [1996] 2 MLJ 68 at 78, CA; Public Prosecutor v. Ini Abong & Ors [2009] 1 CLJ 526; 
Raja Petra Raja Kamaruddin lwn. Pendakwa Raya [2009] 4 CLJ 543.
26 [1974] 1 LNS 80, FC.
27	 Per	Suffian	LP,	at	p.	158.	See	also	Lye Pong Fong v. Public Prosecutor [1998] 1 LNS 327, 
[1998] 6 MLJ 304 at 311; Public Prosecutor v. Au Seh Chun [1998] 3 BLJ 56, [1998] 3 
CLJ Supp 56 at p. 60, [1998] 6 MLJ 179 at p. 183; Public Prosecutor v. Datuk Harun 
bin Haji Idris & Ors [1976] 1 LNS 180; Mohd Rafizi Ramli v. PP [2014] 4 CLJ 1, 
CA. The court in Public Prosecutor v. Lee Tin Bau [1984] 1 LNS 56, emphasised on 
the discretion of  the Attorney General in his capacity as the Public Prosecutor to 
decide	on	what	charges	to	institute	against	anyone	found	in	possession	of 	firearms	
and ammunition. In Mat Shuhaimi Shafiei v. PP [2014]	5	CLJ	22	it	was	stated	that	‘the	
Attorney-General has the sole discretion of  determining criminal prosecutions in 
this country and it is not open to this court to interfere or question the discretion 
exercised by the Attorney-General. If  the appellant is aggrieved that he is charged 
under s. 4(1)(c) of  the Sedition Act 1948, he should channel his complaint to the 
Attorney-General who would then decide whether to continue or discontinue with 
the	criminal	proceeding	against	him.’
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As from the above, the Attorney General has a choice of the penal 
statutes under which to charge an accused and institute proceedings 
for an offence. In fact, the Attorney General is permitted to take into 
account the public interest when deciding what charge or charges to 
prefer against an accused. Hence, the Attorney General can prefer to 
charge the accused with the lesser serious offence such as voluntarily 
causing hurt contrary to s. 324 of the Penal Code instead of an offence 
of voluntarily causing grievous hurt contrary to s. 326 of the Penal 
Code, when the evidence would have justified him to proceed under 
s. 326. Again, in drug cases, even if an accused is arrested under the 
Drug Dependants (Treatment and Rehabilitation) Act 1983 (Act 283), 
this will not bar the Public Prosecutor from charging the accused 
under the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (Revised 1980) (Act 234).28 This 
is because the control and direction of all criminal prosecutions and 
proceedings is vested in the hands of the Public Prosecutor.
In Johnson Tan Han Seng v. Public Prosecutor,29 the appellants had been 
convicted and sentenced to death under s. 57 of the now repealed Internal 
Security Act 1960 for unlawful possession of firearms. The appellants 
argued inter alia, that the Attorney General had discriminated them 
as persons alleged to be in possession of firearms or ammunition and 
charging them with different offences and that there had been a breach 
of art. 8 of the Federal Constitution.30 In dismissing the appeals, the 
Federal Court held:
Here we are asked to determine a different question, namely whether 
the Attorney General may discriminate as between the three persons 
in the example given, or must he charge all three persons under the 
same statute. I am of the opinion that he may discriminate without 
contravening article 8.
28 See Public Prosecutor v. Chan Kam Leong [1989] 1 CLJ 805.
29 [1977] 1 LNS 38, FC.
30 Article 8 provides, inter alia, that all persons are equal before the law and entitled to 
the equal protection of  the law.
Powers Of  The Attorney 
General In Criminal Cases
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A may have had a licence to possess his gun but delayed to renew it. It 
would have been proper for the Attorney General to charge him simply 
under the Arms Act. B on the other hand never had a licence and has a 
criminal record. Must he also be charged under the Arms Act? I think 
that in today’s conditions, when hardly a week goes by without some 
one being robbed by armed men, probably the Attorney General would 
be accused of failing in his duty if he did not charge him under Act 37. 
C also may not have had a licence and may have had a very black record 
and have killed various people and terrorised witnesses so that few 
people are willing to come forward to report, let alone give evidence 
in open court against him. Should he also be charged only under 
the Arms Act simply because A is charged under that Act or under  
Act 37 like B or under ISA? I think that the choice is entirely the 
Attorney General’s.31
Further, in Karpal Singh a/l Ram Singh v. Pendakwa Raya,32 it was stated 
that the Attorney General cannot name any particular magistrate, 
president or judge to try an accused nor direct that a court should 
convict or impose a particular sentence; but apart from this, he has 
a very wide discretion under the CPC and the Constitution. Further, 
there is no law that imposes any time frame on the Attorney General 
to decide whether or not to prosecute the alleged offender once the 
investigation is completed.33 Anybody who has a complaint against the 
Attorney General for exercising his discretion in any particular way 
should direct it not to the courts but elsewhere. That being the case, 
being the guardian of the public whose principal concern is to maintain 
31	 Per	Suffian	LP.
32 [2012] MLJU 752.
33 Zulkiflee SM Anwar Ulhaque & Anor v. Arikrishna Apparau & Ors [2013] 1 LNS 1264, 
CA.
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the rule of law, the Attorney General is expected to act honestly and 
professionally. If he fails to discharge his public duties professionally, 
the public would be able to show their disapproval.
Although the Constitution gives absolute power to the Attorney General 
whether to charge a person or not, nevertheless the public ‘expects him 
to exercise his powers fairly, honestly and professionally.’34 In Public 
Prosecutor v. Zainuddin Sulaiman & Anor,35 Salleh Abas LP stated: 
‘The law and Constitution in giving the Attorney-General an exclusive 
power respecting direction and control over criminal matters expect 
him to exercise it honestly and professionally. The law gives him a 
complete trust in that the exercise of this power is his and his alone and 
that his decision is not open to any judicial review. If he is a Minister 
of the Government he is answerable to Parliament and to his cabinet 
colleagues, and if he is not, the Government will answer for him in 
Parliament, whilst he himself will be answerable to the Government, 
and if he is a civil servant he will be answerable also to the Judicial 
and Legal Service Commission, though anomalously he is a member 
of it. Members of the public expect that he exercises his power bona 
fide and professionally in that when he prefers a charge against an 
individual he does so because public interest demands that prosecution 
should be initiated and when he refrains from charging an individual 
or discontinues a prosecution already initiated he also acts upon the 
dictate of public interest.’36 
34 Per Shaik Daud JCA in Tan Sri Abdul Rahim Mohd Noor v. Public Prosecutor [2001] 4 
CLJ 9, CA.
35 [1986] 1 CLJ 468, SC.
36 In Sundra Rajoo Nadarajah v. Menteri Hal Ehwal Luar Negara, Malaysia & Ors [2019] 
8 CLJ 422, it was held, inter alia, that the Attorney General had the unfettered 
discretion to charge the applicant for criminal offence which this court had no legal 
power to interfere.
Powers Of  The Attorney 
General In Criminal Cases
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24.8 POWER TO CONDUCT CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
As noted earlier, art. 145(3) of the Federal Constitution conferred the 
power to conduct criminal proceedings unto the Attorney General. The 
word ‘conduct’ here refers to the conduct of prosecutions in court. In 
Public Prosecutor v. Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris & Ors,37 it was stated 
inter alia, that the term ‘to conduct’ in the above article conveys the 
idea of leading and guiding, that is to say, a person who conducts a 
prosecution determines all important questions of policy involved in 
the course of a trial and the attitude to be adopted by the prosecution 
towards material objections raised or demands made by the accused 
with respect to the evidence. Again, in Repco Holdings Bhd v. Public 
Prosecutor,38 Gopal Sri Ram JCA to the phrase ‘institute, conduct and 
discontinue’ in art. 145(3) of the Federal Constitution, said:
It will be seen at once, from a reading of the plain language of art. 145(3), 
that the supreme law, namely the Federal Constitution, has committed 
to the hands of the Attorney General the sole power, exercisable at his 
discretion, to institute, conduct and discontinue criminal proceedings. 
The phrase ‘institute, conduct or discontinue’ was considered by 
Abdoolcader J (as he then was) in Public Prosecutor v. Datuk Hj Harun 
bin Hj Idris & Ors [1976] 1 LNS 180, [1976] 2 MLJ 116 at 119. Of the 
expression ‘conduct’ his Lordship stated:
‘Conduct’ in art. 145(3) cannot but refer to the conduct of 
prosecutions in court, as it indeed appears ipsissimis verbis in s. 377 
of the Code. And ‘control and direction’ in s. 376(i) of the Code is 
in respect of all criminal prosecutions and proceedings, and not of 
criminal procedure or the jurisdiction of the courts.
‘Conduct’ of criminal prosecutions and proceedings in art. 145(3) 
cannot connote the regulation of criminal procedure or of the 
jurisdiction of the courts or the power or discretion to do so. Any 
contrary contention would in effect in my view be tantamount to 
the suggestion of the Public Prosecutor arrogating to himself the 
37 See Public Prosecutor v. Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris & Ors [1976] 1 LNS 180. 
38 [1997] 4 CLJ 740.
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legislative powers vested in Parliament under Item 4 and in particular 
paragraph (b) thereof List I (Federal List) in the Ninth Schedule to 
the Constitution, with perhaps also the not inconceptible resultant 
intrusion or at least a more than peripheral incursion into the 
sphere of art. 121(1) of the Constitution which provides that the 
judicial power of the Federation is vested in two High Courts and 
in such inferior courts as may be provided by federal law namely, 
the Subordinate Courts Act 1948 which specifies the subordinate 
courts and their respective civil and criminal jurisdiction.
Pursuing its signification, ‘to conduct’ means ‘to lead, guide, manage’ 
(In re Bhupalli Malliah AIR [1959] AP 477; Pride of Derby v. British 
Celanese Ltd [1953] 1 Ch 149, at p 167 per Lord Evershed, MR). It 
conveys the idea of leading and guiding, that is to say, the person 
who conducts the prosecution determines all important questions 
of policy involved in the courts of the trial and the attitude to be 
adopted by the prosecution towards material objections raised or 
demands made by the accused with respect to the evidence.
Abdoolcader J’s interpretation of the phrase ‘institute, conduct or 
discontinue’ was approved and applied by the Federal Court in Public 
Prosecutor v. Lim Shui Wang & Ors [1978] 1 LNS 155.
... The only authority that is constitutionally entitled to conduct 
prosecutions is the Attorney General as Public Prosecutor. The 
adjectival vehicle contained in s. 376 and subsequent sections of the 
Criminal Procedure Code put this beyond doubt.39
As art. 145(3) of the Federal Constitution conferred on the Attorney 
General the exclusive authority to conduct prosecutions, it must follow 
that no other authority may be lawfully empowered to exercise that 
function. Gopal Sri Ram JCA, in Repco Holdings Bhd, referred to Long 
Samat & Ors v. Public Prosecutor40 and Johnson Tan Hang Seng v. Public 
Prosecutor,41 and stated:
39 Ibid, at pp. 746-747.
40 [1974] 1 LNS 80.
41 [1977] 1 LNS 38.
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The importance of the proposition formulated by the learned Lord 
President in these two cases is that, as a matter of public law, the 
exercise of discretion by the Attorney-General in the context of art. 
145(3) is put beyond judicial review. In other words, the exercise by the 
Attorney- General of his discretion, in one way or another, under under 
art. 145(3) cannot be questioned in the courts by way of certiorari, 
declaration or other judicial review proceedings.
I think that the proposition is not only good law but good policy. 
For, were it otherwise, upon each occasion that the Attorney-General 
decides not to institute or to conduct or discontinue a particular 
criminal proceeding, he will be called upon to account to a court of 
law the reasons for his decision. It will then be the court and not the 
Attorney-General who will be exercising the power under art. 145(3). 
That was surely not the intent on our founding fathers who framed our 
Constitution for us.
It must be added that s. 377 of the CPC further lists out those persons 
who are competent to conduct criminal prosecutions with the 
authorisation in writing of the Public Prosecutor. The section provides:
Every criminal prosecution before any court and every inquiry 
before a Magistrate shall, subject to the following sections, be 
conducted –
(a) by the Public Prosecutor, a Senior Deputy Public Prosecutor, 
a Deputy Public Prosecutor or an Assistant Public Prosecutor;
(b) subject to the control and direction of the Public Prosecutor, 
by the following persons who are authorised in writing by the 
Public Prosecutor:
(1) an advocate;
(2) a police officer not below the rank of Inspector;
(3) an officer of any Government department;
(4) an officer of any local authority;
(5) an officer of any statutory authority or body; or
(6) any person employed or retained by any local authority 
or any statutory authority or body.
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In PP v. Cang Ceng Transport Co,42 it was held that the proceeding in 
this case was a nullity because the Road Transport Department (JPJ) 
officers who initiated the proceedings under s. 19(1)(b)(vi) of the 
Commercial Vehicles Licensing Board Act 1987 (Act) in the name of 
JPJ did not produce any written authority to the learned magistrate 
to prove that they are fit and proper person appointed by the public 
prosecutor to prosecute. By virtue of s. 45 of the Act read with 
art. 145(3) of the Federal Constitution and s. 376(3A) of the CPC, the 
prosecution in the court below in the name of the JPJ and without the 
written appointment under ss. 376(3A) and 377(b) of the CPC by the 
Public Prosecutor renders the prosecution of the respondent a nullity 
and void ab initio.
Further, there are certain offences that require the consent of the Public 
Prosecutor before prosecutions for those offences may be instituted. 
‘Consent’ may be defined as ‘an act of reason, accompanied with 
deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on 
each side.’43 For example, an offence under s. 39B of the Dangerous 
Drugs Act 1952 requires the consent of the Public Prosecutor. In 
particular, s. 39B(3) of that Act provides that a prosecution for the 
offence of trafficking in dangerous drugs under s. 39B will not be 
instituted except by or with the consent of the Public Prosecutor. Again, 
art. 183 of the Federal Constitution provides that no action, civil or 
criminal, shall be instituted against the YDPA or the Ruler of a State in 
respect of anything done or omitted to be done by him in his personal 
capacity except with the consent of the Attorney General personally.44
42 [2012] 7 CLJ 292.
43 See Abdul Hamid v. Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 LNS 3.
44 See also Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Bhd v. Duli Yang Maha Mulia Tuanku 
Ja’afar Ibni Almarhum Tuanku Abdul Rahman, Yang Di Pertuan Besar Negeri Sembilan 
Darul Khusus & Another Case [2009] 3 CLJ 709; DYTM Tengku Idris Shah Ibni Sultan 
Salahuddin Abdul Aziz Shah v. Dikim Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [2003] 1 CLJ 801; 
Faridah Begum Bte Abdullah v. Sultan Ahmad Shah Al Mustain Billah Ibni Almarhum 
Sultan Abu Bakar Ri’ayatuddin Al Mu’adzam Shah (Sued In His Personal Capacity) [1996] 
2 CLJ 159.
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It is worthy to note that any proceedings by or against the YDPA or the 
Ruler of a State in his personal capacity shall be brought in the Special 
Court for Rulers. The Special Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction 
to try all offences committed in the Federation by the YDPA or the 
Ruler of a State and all civil cases by or against the YDPA or the Ruler 
of a State notwithstanding where the cause of action arose. The consent 
of the Public Prosecutor may be given orally or in writing. Where the 
Public Prosecutor or a Deputy Public Prosecutor prosecutes, there is an 
implied consent to the prosecution.45
The central issue in Peguam Negara Malaysia v. Chin Chee Kow & 
Another Appeal46 was whether the court could review a decision of the 
Attorney General in granting or refusing consent pursuant to s. 9(1) of 
the Government Proceedings Act 1956. In relation to the above, Mohd 
Zawawi Salleh FCJ, delivering the judgment of the court stated: “We 
would like to reiterate the important pronouncement in Semenyih Jaya 
Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat & Another Case... In 
this case, the Federal Court emphatically declared that the power of 
judicial review ‘cannot be changed or altered by Parliament by way 
of a constitutional amendment’. The court further stated, ‘The power 
of judicial review is essential to the constitutional role of the courts, 
and inherent in basic structure of the constitution’. The Federal Court’s 
reassertion of constitutional judicial power and its status as superior 
court meant that the power of the AG to grant or refuse consent under 
s. 9(1) of Act 359 is amenable to judicial review.”
45 See Perumal v. Public Prosecutor [1970] 1 LNS 101, FC.
46 [2019] 4 CLJ 561, FC.
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24.9 POWER TO DISCONTINUE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
The power of the Public Prosecutor to discontinue proceedings 
could arise due to several factors, for example when there is lack of 
evidence, the evidence is fatally flawed or the accused has died, among 
others. The power to discontinue proceedings under art. 145(3) of the 
Federal Constitution should be read together with s. 254 of the CPC 
under which the Public Prosecutor may decline to prosecute further 
at any stage of the trial before the delivery of judgment. The power to 
discontinue proceedings is similar to the power to stay proceedings. 
This is technically known as nolle prosequi (unwilling to pursue). The 
exercise of such power is not subject to control by the courts.47 In 
Perselvam Munusamy v. PP,48 Mohd Zaki Abdul Wahab JC stated:
Once a case has been instituted or conducted, the sole discretion lies 
with the Public Prosecutor to determine whether the case should be 
proceeded or discontinued. It also follows that the victim of crime or the 
complainant will have no say in determining whether a case should be 
proceeded or discontinued. What the victim or the complainant could 
do is to take their wishes to the Public Prosecutor and it is entirely up to 
the Public Prosecutor to exercise its discretion whether to withdraw the 
charge(s) against the accused. This is consistent with the general tenor 
of the role of the Public Prosecutor vis-a-vis the criminal jurisprudence 
whereby a criminal offence strikes at the victim as well as members of 
the public at large. Thus to sum up, it is my considered view that a wish 
of the victim is not the ultimate decider of guilt or otherwise of the 
accused. More so in the present case where the reasons for the victim’s 
wish became apparent.
47 See Poh Cho Ching v. Public Prosecutor [1981] CLJ Rep 229. 
48 [2012] 1 LNS 787.
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If the Public Prosecutor discontinues an action against an accused by 
informing the court that he will not proceed to prosecute the accused 
on the charge, the practice which has been consistently adopted by the 
court is to discharge and acquit the accused.49 Unless some very good 
ground is shown, it would not be right to leave an individual for an 
indefinite period with a charge hanging over him.50
24.10 ATTORNEY GENERAL TO REPRESENT JUDGES 
SUED IN PERSONAL CAPACITY
When a judge is sued in his personal capacity the Attorney General 
shall represent the said judge. For example, in Indah Desa Saujana 
Corporation Sdn Bhd & Ors v. James Foong Cheng Yuen & Anor,51 a civil 
suit was filed against the High Court judge. One of the issues raised 
was whether the Attorney General was legally bound to represent 
the judge in such case. In seeking to prevent the Attorney General or 
his officers from representing the first defendant, plaintiff submitted 
inter alia, that the first defendant’s acts were not while sitting in the 
course of a case as a judge. On the other hand, learned Senior Federal 
Counsel contended that the decision of the court below was correct as 
the Attorney General was, under art. 145 of the Federal Constitution, 
bound, and in the interest of the administration of justice, to represent 
a judge who performed functions under the Federal Constitution. In 
support of their argument, the learned Federal Counsel referred to 
the case of Tun Dato’ Hj Mohamed Salleh Abas v. Tan Sri Dato’ Abdul 
Hamid Omar & Ors.52 In James Foong’s case, it was held inter alia, that 
49 See K Abdul Rasheed v. Public Prosecutor, Ah Chak Arnold v. Public Prosecutor [1985] 1 
LNS 54.
50 See Koh Teck Chai v. Public Prosecutor [1967] 1 LNS 72. See also Mohd Munzil Bin 
Muhamad,	‘Article	145(3)	of 	The	Federal	Constitution:	A	Formidable	Discretion’	
[2010] 1 LNS(A) i.
51 [2008] 1 CLJ 651, CA.
52 [1988] 2 CLJ 739; [1988] 1 CLJ (Rep) 294, SC.
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the Attorney General is a public officer under the Federal Constitution 
and art. 145 of the Federal Constitution, when properly read, gives 
ample power to the Attorney General to represent the government and 
any body or persons performing any functions under the Constitution 
and this necessarily includes the judges.
24.11 ATTORNEY GENERAL REPRESENTED 
GOVERNMENT AT INTERNATIONAL COURT  
OF JUSTICE AND TRIBUNALS
The Attorney General also has appeared in many civil cases at the 
international adjudication bodies on behalf of the government and this 
includes the International Court of Justice and International Tribunals. 
For example, Tan Sri Abdul Gani Patail,53 the former Attorney General 
had appeared and submitted before the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in September 2003, regarding the ‘Case 
Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits 
of Johor between Malaysia and Singapore (Request for provisional 
measures)’ in which ITLOS had delivered its Order on 8 October 2003.54 
Further, the Attorney General had appeared before the Tribunal of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
regarding the case of Malaysian Historical Salvadors Sdn Bhd against 
The Government of Malaysia in May 2006.55 In November 2007, the 
Attorney General had appeared and submitted before the International 
Court of Justice in The Hague regarding the ‘Case Concerning 
Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/ Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and 
South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore).’56
53 Honourable Tan Sri Abdul Gani Patail is the eighth Attorney General of  Malaysia 
and his appointment was effective since 1 January 2002.
54	 See	 https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_12/Order. 
08.10.03. E.pdf
55	 See	http://italaw.com/documents/MHSMemorial-on-Jurisdcition.pdf 	
56	 See	http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14492.pdf 	
Attorney General Represented Government 
At International Court Of  Justice And Tribunals
 
FOR ACADEMIC 
REPOSITORY 
PURPOSES 
ONLY
754 Attorney General: Role And Powers
24.12 PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY
The issue whether the Attorney General and his deputies enjoy absolute 
prosecutorial immunity or whether the immunity can be lifted in 
appropriate circumstance was recently deliberated in Rosli bin Dahlan 
v. Tan Sri Abdul Gani Patail & Ors.57 In the above case, it was argued 
on behalf of the defendants that no civil action can be maintained 
against the 1st, 4th, 5th, and 6th defendants in respect of the exercise 
of their prosecutorial discretion even if the alleged actions were not 
in accordance to law or was coloured or tainted by lack of good faith 
or was done due to personal spite or when there was abuse of the 
prosecutorial discretion. In other words, the above defendants enjoyed 
absolute prosecutorial immunity in respect of the exercise of their 
prosecutorial discretion and power. The Court however, noted that the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion is subject to judicial scrutiny under 
certain circumstances for example, when there is a clear violation of 
the established statutory or constitutional rights. In particular, Vazeer 
Alam Mydin Meera JC stated:
if the Attorney General as the custodian of prosecutorial power 
exercises his prosecutorial discretion for other than its constitutional 
purpose or exercises it based on some irrelevant consideration or 
exercises his discretion unlawfully or the prosecutorial power is abused 
for some improper purpose, then that decision can become justiciable 
and the courts have a duty to render assistance to an individual who has 
been aggrieved by that decision.
On the issue of prosecutorial absolute immunity, the learned Judge 
referred to the approach in the selected common law jurisdictions 
namely, Singapore,58 Canada,59 England60 and India.61 In the above 
57	 [2014]	 1	 LNS	 616.	 See	 also	 Prosecutorial	 immunity:	 a	 review	 of 	 Rosli Dahlan 
v. Tan Sri Abdul Gani Bin Patail & Ors [2015] 1 MLJ xcvii.
58 See Law Society of  Singapore v. Tan Guan Huat Neo Phyllis [2007] SGHC 207; [2008] 2 
SLR 239 (CA).
59 See Nelles v. Ontario [1989] SCJ No 86 (SCC).
60 See Riches v. Director of  Public Prosecutions [1973] 2 All ER 935, CA.
61 See Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of  India 1996 AIR SC 3538.
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mentioned jurisdictions there is no absolute prosecutorial immunity 
and thus under exceptional circumstances, a person aggrieved by the 
prosecutor’s decision due to the alleged misuse or abuse of power may 
seek private law remedies in courts such as malicious prosecution and 
misfeasance in public office. In particular, the learned Judge stated:
These case authorities, both local and from foreign common law 
jurisdictions, further show that the notion of unfettered exercise of 
power or discretion by public officials is not consonant with the rule 
of law and there is a clear move to make public officers accountable for 
their action, for it is generally accepted that accountability promotes 
the rule of law. In this regard, the notion of absolute prosecutorial 
immunity for the Public Prosecutor and his Deputies, who are public 
officers, is anathema to the modern day notions of accountability 
and the rule of law. This is in keeping with developments in modern 
jurisprudence, as can be seen from the cases cited above, that absolute 
immunity for public officials has no place in a progressive democratic 
society and is contrary to the rule of law. It must be gain said that in a 
legal system where the rule of law is central, no one is above the law.
Reference was also made to s. 6 of the Government Proceedings Act, 
1956 and s. 72 of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 
2009 that limits liability for public servants and the government. These 
provisions according to the learned Judge were nowhere near absolute 
immunity. In particular, Vazeer Alam Mydin Meera JC stated:
So, it can be quite clearly seen that whenever the legislature provided 
for statutory immunity from legal proceedings for public officers, it has 
always come with a rider, and that rider was the requirement of good 
faith in the exercise of that public officer’s powers or discretion. The 
shield was never an absolute one. At this stage of the proceedings, the 
court is only concerned with whether facts are pleaded with sufficient 
particulars to give rise to such remedies and it would then have to go 
to trial for the Plaintiff to establish his case. Therefore, I am unable to 
accept the defendant’s counsel’s contention that the claim against the 
1st, 3rd and 4th defendants are unsustainable by reason of absolute 
prosecutorial immunity.
Prosecutorial Immunity
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Thus, based on the case of Rosli Dahlan above, the public prosecutor and 
his deputies do not enjoy absolute prosecutorial immunity. They can be 
subject to civil liability in respect of claims of abuse of prosecutorial 
power, malicious prosecution, or misfeasance in public office, or where 
the prosecutorial discretion had been exercised with malice or for 
improper purpose, among others.
Aside from the above, it is also noteworthy that although the judges,62 
deputy registrars63 and other officers of the civil courts such as sheriff, 
bailiff and all others persons who execute the lawful orders or warrants 
issued by a judge, are accorded statutory immunity by s. 14 of the 
Courts of Judicature Act 1964, however such immunity is not absolute. 
The immunity is subject to the requirement that the above mentioned 
persons in the exercise of their judicial duties and functions must 
act in good faith. Under certain circumstances however, the judicial 
immunity can be pierced for example, when the judicial officer had 
acted mala fides, ultra vires or without jurisdiction.64 The purpose 
62 See Indah Desa Saujana Corporation Sdn Bhd & Ors v. James Foong Cheng Yuen & Anor 
[2008] 1 CLJ 651, CA; [2005] 4 CLJ 925, HC; Hodan-R Sdn Bhd v. Dato’ Mohd 
Hishamudin Hj Mohd Yunus [2007] 2 CLJ 701; Takang Timber Sdn Bhd v. The Government 
of  Sarawak & Anor [1998] 3 CLJ SUPP 413.
63 See Law Hock Hua & Anor v. Timbalan Pendaftar Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur & 
Anor	[2006]	4	CLJ	300	where	it	was	held	that	the	first	defendant,	i.e.	the	Deputy	
Registrar, was also protected by s. 14 of  the CJA.
64 See Penolong Kanan Pendaftar Mahkamah Tinggi Johor Bahru v. Tan Beng Sooi [1997] 2 
CLJ 409; Thilagavathy Durairajoo v. Penolong Kanan Pendaftar [2002] 1 LNS 148; Tai 
Choi Yu v. Ian Chin Hon Chong [2002] 2 CLJ 259. The concept of  judicial immunity at 
common law and statutory law was aptly explained by Low Hop Bing JCA in Indah 
Desa Saujana Corporation Sdn Bhd & Ors v. James Foong Cheng Yuen & Anor [2008] 1 
CLJ 651, 675-680, CA.
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of s. 14 is not to protect the personal interest of a judge but rather to 
protect the public interest in an independent and impartial justice 
system.65 In Law Hock Hua & Anor v. Timbalan Pendaftar Mahkamah 
Tinggi Kuala Lumpur & Anor,66 Rohana Yusuf JC stated:
[The] ... basis for judicial immunity is rooted in the need to protect the 
public but not a need to protect judges. Amongst the most important 
tribute that judges owe to the public are objectivity, independence and 
impartiality. Thus, any innovative legal argument invoked against these 
attributes must be carefully scrutinised. It must be so, in order to ensure 
the public that a presiding judge is discharging his duty without having 
to worry, or that his decision would not be based on a dispassionate 
appreciation of the facts and law related to the dispute. Otherwise, he 
may be affected by thoughts as to which party would pose a threat of 
litigation.
24.13 CONCLUSION
The Attorney-General is the principal legal adviser to the Government 
of Malaysia on matters of law and legal opinion. His role and 
responsibilities is to advise the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (YDPA) or the 
cabinet or any minister upon such legal matters, and to perform such 
other duties of a legal character, as may from time to time be referred or 
assigned to him, and to discharge the functions conferred on him by the 
Constitution or any other written law. Section 376(1) of the Criminal 
Procedure Code provides that the Public Prosecutor has the control 
and direction of all criminal prosecutions and proceedings under the 
Code. Further, the powers of the Attorney General is explained in 
art. 145(3) of the Federal Constitution. The Attorney General has a choice 
65 See Tee Yam v. Timbalan Menteri, Menteri Keselamatan Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors 
[2005] 6 CLJ 550.
66 [2006] 4 CLJ 300.
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of the penal statutes under which to charge an accused and institute 
proceedings for an offence. In fact, the Attorney General is permitted 
to take into account the public interest when deciding what charge or 
charges to prefer against an accused. It must be added that where crime 
has been committed, the police would conduct the investigation in 
accordance with the procedures laid down in the Criminal Procedure 
Code. Upon completing the investigation, the investigation report will 
then be submitted to the Attorney General’s chambers who will then 
determine whether the evidence are overwhelming to institute and 
conduct criminal proceedings and prosecutions. In short, in criminal 
matters, the Attorney General act independently and does not receive 
or take direction and instruction from the Government. That being 
the case, being the guardian of the public whose principal concern is 
to maintain the rule of law, the Attorney General is expected to act 
honestly and professionally. If he fails to discharge his public duties 
professionally, the public would be able to show their disapproval. 
The public expects the Attorney General to exercise his powers fairly, 
honestly and professionally.
